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-IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO ZuuO FEB 25 p I: 3g 
CHARLES MURRAY, Administrator 
of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
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CASE NO. 312322 
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER 
DEFENDANT STATE OF OHIO'S 
MEMORANDUM REGARDING 
VOIR DIRE OF EMANUEL 
TANAY 
Defendant State of Ohio submits the attached memorandum of law for the Court's 
consideration while conducting the voir dire examination of Emanuel Tanay, who is being 
called by plaintiff to provide expert testimony in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney 
Of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
K~.dv~ 
KATHLEEN A. MARTIN (0040017) 
Litigation Manager, Civil Division 
The Justice Center, Courts Tower 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
-
MEMORANDUM OF LA \V 
INTRODUCTION 
The Rules of Evidence regarding the admission of expert testimony place upon the 
trial court a special obligation as "gatekeeper" to ensure that expert testimony is both relevant 
and reliable. See Kumho Tire Co., LTD v. Charmichael (1999), 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1174; 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), 113 S. Ct. 2786; Evid. R. 702. 
Additionally, the witness must be qualified as an expert regarding this subject matter of the 
testimony, First Nat'l Bank of Southwestern Ohio v. Miami University (1997), 121 Ohio 
App.3d 170. Moreover, expert testimony must be "helpful" to the jury in that it relates to a 
matter beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons. 
Hearsay may not be the basis of an expert's opinion. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Caputo 
- (Ohio App. 8 Dist. 1998), 126 Ohio App.3d 401, 414. There, the appeals court reversed the 
admission of an experts' opinion regarding the progress and bum pattern of a fire because the 
opinion was based upon hearsay statements found in the State Fire Marshall's reports. Also, 
expert testimony is not admissible when it contains the propensity inference prohibited by 
Evid. R. 404. State v. Smith (Ohio App. 2 Dist. 1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 647. 
-
TANA Y'S PRINCIPLE OPINION 
Although Dr. Tanay has several additional opinions, it is fair to say that his principle 
opinion is stated in the conclusion paragraph of his opinion report, p4. There, he opines, " ... 
it is my firm opinion that the available information supports the view that Marilyn Reese 
Sheppard was murdered in her bed in July 1954 by Richard Eberling and not by her husband 
Sam Sheppard." 
-
The logic supporting Tanay's opinion that Samuel H. Sheppard is innocent and that 
Richard Eberling is as follows. 
In Tanay's view, the crime scene and wounds of Marilyn Sheppard suggests that the 
crime was committed by a "sadistic compulsive murderer." Next, according to Tanay, 
Richard Eberling's "antisocial behavior" and his "personality" conform to that crime. On the 
other hand, according to Tanay, Samuel H. Sheppard's "personality" and his history as a 
"law abiding conscientious altruistic individual" do not conform to the crime. 
The first problem is whether this opinion is based upon facts and data received by 
Tanay or otherwise admitted in evidence in this case, as required by Evid. R. 703, or whether 
they are impermissibly based on hearsay. It is the understanding of the State of Ohio that 
Tanay's knowledge base includes such hearsay items as the "Mockery of Justice" book, the 
- AMS EC report, etc. It is respectfully urged that the voir dire of Tanay should include a 
-
careful examination of whether his opinions are based on competent evidence. 
Apparently anticipating, correctly, that the State of Ohio will object to Tanay's 
evidence as violating Evid. R. 404, plaintiff has submitted three cases for the Court's 
consideration, State v. Tomlin (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 724; State v. Nemeth (1998), 82 Ohio 
St.2d 202; State v. Stowers ( 1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 260. None of those cases even remotely 
support the proposition that Tanay should be permitted to offer testimony that the character 
of Samuel H. Sheppard was inconsistent with a purported "sadistic compulsive murderer" 
and that the character of Richard Eberling was consistent with a "sadistic compulsive 
murderer". 
In the Tomlin, supra., the defendant was charged with having a weapon under 
disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(4). A "chronic alcoholic" is a person under 
--
disability for purposes of that statute. Evidence was introduced at trial regarding the 
defendant's prior abuse of alcohol and related criminal offenses while intoxicated and the 
testimony of a clinical psychologist was admitted to define "chronic alcoholic" and to opine 
that a person with defendant's history of prior alcohol-related incidents is a "chronic 
alcoholic." Establishing that a person is a "chronic alcoholic" was an element of the crime 
charged. State v. Tomlin stands for the established principle that character evidence is 
admissible when it is an element of a crime or cause of action. \Vhen character is "in issue", 
"other acts" testimony and related opinion testimony it is not used as a basis for the 
impermissible "propensity" inference, it is a terminal point of required proof. 
In State v. Nemeth, supra., the court held that it was error to preclude introduction of 
expert testimony, on behalf of a sixteen year old defendant charged with the murder of his 
mother, regarding the psychological effects of long-term child abuse, including the effect on 
a child's perception of danger. The court determined that the testimony was allowable in 
support of a self-defense theory or to justify an instruction on a lesser included defense to 
murder. The purpose of the proffered testimony was to support a terminal point of proof in 
which defendant bore the burden, i.e. self defense. Also, as the accused in a criminal case, 
Evid. R. 404(A)(l) provides a special exception to the general exclusion of character 
testimony and permits the accused to offer evidence of a pertinent trait of his character. 
Nor does State v. Stowers, supra., support the proposition that Dr. Tanay should be 
permitted to testify that the character of Richard Eberling conforms with a sadistic 
compulsive murder and that the character of Samuel H. Sheppard does not. In Stowers, a 
defendant was convicted of four counts of rape. All the victims were his children and all four 
testified at trial. Three of the children changed their stories between their initial questioning 
--
-
and the time of trial. The court determined that it was permissible to allow a clinic 
psychologist to testify that the behavior of the children that had changed their stories was 
consistent with the behavior of other children who had been sexually abused. The testimony 
was permitted to help assist the fact finder in assessing the children's veracity to "counter 
balance the trier of fact's natural tendency to assess recantation and delayed disclosures as 
going against the believability and the truthfulness of the witness." Id. at 263. Permitting a 
psychologist to explain that the children victim's behavior in recantation or delayed 
disclosure of their victimization is common in cases of sexual abused children, is a far cry 
from allowing Tanay to suggest to the jury that they should conclude the Richard Eberling 
killed Marilyn Sheppard because of his antisocial character or that they should infer that 
Samuel H. Sheppard is innocent because of his altruistic character. 
Tanay's opinion and the series of impermissible inferences on which it is based is 
similar to the testimony determined to be reversible error in State v. Smith, (Ohio App. 2 
Dist. 1992), 84 Ohio App.3d 64 7. There, the trial court impermissibly admitted expert 
testimony concerning behavior typical of pedophiles who engage in sexual activity with 
children. The admissibility of the evidence was deemed reversible error because it was 
offered to suggest that the defendant possessed the character traits as a typical pedophile and 
that he acted in conformity to that trait. 
The prosecution strategy in Smith, which the court rejected, was built as follows. 
First, it introduced evidence of the defendant's prior behavior and association with the 
victims. If the matter had ended there, the prosecution's case would have been acceptable 
since the defendant's prior behavior with the alleged victims tended to establish defendant's 
scheme or plan. However, the prosecution then submitted expert testimony regarding 
pedophiles in general and the behavior they typically exhibit which leads to their eventual 
sexual abuse of children. In explaining that the expert's testimony violated Evid. R. 404, the 
court stated: 
Though the content of Dr. Bergman's testimony was general in nature, it 
was, when connected with evidence of the defendant's other acts with the 
children, offered by the state circumstantially to infer that the defendant is 
a pedophile, that is, one who is sexually orientated to and attracted toward 
children. This aspect of his personality was then offered as a propensity 
from which the jury was asked to infer that he acted in accordance with his 
propensity to commit the crimes alleged. 
*** 
We find that the expert testimony of Dr. Bergman constituted evidence 
tending to show a trait of the defendant's character offered for the purpose 
of proving that he acted in conformity with that trait on the occasion of the 
crime alleged. The fact that the evidence were circumstantial in nature 
and provided a set of typical behaviors or "profile" to which the 
defendant's behavior was then matched does not avoid the objectionable 
feature, which is determined by the purpose for which it is offered. When 
that purpose is the inference prohibited by Evid. R. 404, the evidence is 
- inadmissible. 
Id. at 662-663. 
In the instant case, plaintiffs strategy seems identical to that rejected in State v. 
Smith. 
Plaintiffs would like to display the life history and personality of Richard Eberling as 
consisting of various "other acts" of antisocial behavior and then advance that he has the 
propensity of a "sadistic compulsive murder" who acted in conformity therewith murdering 
Marilyn Sheppard. Then, plaintiff wants to advance the life history of Samuel H. Sheppard 
as constituting "other acts" of consciousness, abiding by the law and possessing an altruistic 
character which is not in conformity with a sadistic compulsive murder. 
The in appropriateness ofTanay's strategy and its violence to the Rules of Evidence it 
is further demonstrated in State v. Rogers (Ohio App. 81h Dist. 1991), Case No. 58557, 
~-
unreported, and State v. Clemons (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 701. 
In State v. Rogers supra. defendant was indicted with a single count of theft involving 
computers. The court determined that permitting the prosecution to display throughout the 
trial legal weapons which were found in the defendant's home and to suggest that the 
defendant was "suicidal" violated Evid. R. 404. In citing United States v. Phillips ( 1979), 
599of2nd 134, the court explained: 
Two concerns are expressed by the first sentence of Rule 404(b): (1) that 
the jury may convict a "bad man" who deserves to be punished ... not 
because he is guilty of the crime charged but because of his prior or 
subsequent misdeed; and (2) that the jury will infer that because the 
accused committed other crimes, he probably committed the crime 
charged. Id. @4. 
State v. Clemons, supra., is also instructive. There the court reversed a conviction for 
gross sexual imposition based upon the admission of evidence of the defendant's "problem" 
- with masturbation, watching pornographic movies and the like because there was no valid 
Rule 404(B) purpose for the testimony. Rather, the appeals court determined that the 
testimony was inflammatory and elicited for the improper purpose of showing that the 
defendant had a tendency to engage in the types of crimes for which he was charged. 
It is respectfully requested that the vi or dire examination of Tanay includes a careful 
probe to determine whether his opinion, in the end, amounts to nothing more than the 
impermissible inference that Richard Eberling killed Marilyn Sheppard in conformity with 
his other "bad" character traits. 
TANA Y'S OTHER OPINIONS 
Based upon Tanay's June 30, 1999 opinion report, it is requested that the voir dire of 
Tanay be conducted to insure that Tanay will not be offering opinions outside of the realm of 
-- his expertise or on topics irrelevant to this case. Examples include: 
--
-
1. Samuel H. Sheppard's conviction was the result of pseudo evidence; 
2. Eberling was able to kill Ethel Durkin because of the inadequacy of the 
investigation of Marilyn Sheppard; 
3. Recognition of a sadistic compulsive type homicide requires the assistance of 
experts 
4. The killing of Marilyn Sheppard included sexual abuse; 
5. Any criticism of the work of the pathologist in 1954; 
6. The injuries Samuel H. Sheppard were not self inflicted; 
7. Self infliction of injury is not consistent with Samuel H. Sheppard's personality; 
8. The State of Ohio takes the position in this case that the murder was a "carefully 
plan homicide"; 
9. That there is physical evidence contradicting a quarrel as a precipitant for a 
sudden rage response. 
10. That there is no evidence in supportive of the conclusion that Samuel H. Sheppard 
killed his wife other than the fact that he was in the house at the time of the 
murder. 
11. That the 1954 conviction of Samuel H. Sheppard was due to unfounded publicity. 
The opinions above are largely irrelevant to whether Plaintiffs are able to prove in 
this Court to this jury that Samuel H. Sheppard is innocent of the murder of his wife and 
certainly beyond whatever expertise Tanay has as a forensic psychologist. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney 
Of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
?::,ve_a<~ 
KATHLEEN A. MARTIN (0040017) 
Litigation Manager, Civil Division 
The Justice Center, Courts Tower 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT 
--
-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Motion of Defendant, State of Ohio, for Limiting Instruction 
was hand delivered to Terry H. Gilbert, 1370 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, this 
251h day of February, 2000. 
~ A-11~ 
KATHLEEN A. MARTIN (0040017) 
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JUDGE R. SUSTER 
STATE OF OHIO'S 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW 
RE: APPLICABILITY OF 
EVID. R. 404 TO NON -
PARTIES AND RENEWED 




MURDER OF ETHEL 
DURKIN 
Defendant has objected to admission of evidence of" other acts" presented by 
plaintiff for the purpose of incriminating Richard Eberling. Defendant's objections are 
based upon Evid. R. 404 which prohibits the use of character evidence to prove that an 
individual acted in conformity therewith. This court has questioned whether Evid. R. 
404 applies to third parties . As demonstrated below, it does. Defendant submits 
herewith its authority in support of a limiting instruction regarding Richard Eberling's 
conviction of the murder of Ethel Durkin. 
·-
-
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
The Ohio Supreme Court stated in 1998, "Evidence. R. 404, by its terms, applies to 
all character evidence, not simply to persons accused of crimes ... ", State v. Mason, 
(1998) 82 Ohio St.3d 144, at 160, Emphasis Added. The issue the court evaluated was 
the exclusion by the trial court of evidence of other acts of the victim's husband, whom 
the defendant (Mason) alleged had committed the murder. In finding that such evidence 
is properly excluded under Evid. R. 404, the court stated: 
"Exclusion from a murder trial of evidence of prior specific violent acts by the 
victim's husband, who defendant claimed was the killer, did not violate 
defendant's constitutional rights, where the evidence was inadmissible under the 
rule generally prohibiting character evidence", State v. Mason, supra, syllabus. 
Also it is clear that Evid. R. 404 fully applies to civil action. Tschantz v. Ferguson 
(Eighth District 1994), 97 Ohio App.3d 693. 
Under the foregoing authority it is abundantly clear that Evid.R. 404 's prohibition 
against the use of character evidence in order to prove that a person acted in conformity 
therewith applies to all character evidence. Accordingly, defendant respectfully renews 
its motion for a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the conviction of Richard 
Eberling for the murder of Ethel Durkin. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM D. MASON, CUYAHOGA 
COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Law Re: Applicability of Evid. R. 404 to 
Nonparties was served personally upon Terry Gilbert, counsel for plaintiff, in Court 
Room 20 B, Courts Tower, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
arilyn Cassidy 
Assistant Prosecutor 
3 
